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I. INTRODUCTION
All evidence introduced in court must meet some threshold standard in
order to be admitted. Even the lowliest of proof must pass a relevancy test.
In the context of expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the
precise threshold that must be met remains in considerable doubt, even
nearly twenty-five years after the Supreme Court sought to clarify the
standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 The single-most
important principle announced in Daubert was that some measure of
scientific realism should guide trial court admissibility decisions. In the case
of scientific evidence, for instance, “scientific knowledge” and “scientific
validity” were the prescribed guidelines.2 But in respect to all expert
evidence, trial courts were required to evaluate the underlying bases for the
proffered expert opinion to assess whether it was adequately valid and
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1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert, decided in 1993,
is often used as shorthand for the current Rule 702, which was amended in 2000 largely to
codify the standard set forth in that case. Hence, the applicable rule is 702, but the Daubert
decision continues to be cited for having set minimum expectations for the quality of expert
opinion evidence offered in court.
2
Id. at 589–92.
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reliable.3 For all expert opinions, the trial court was to be the gatekeeper to
ensure that there were “good grounds” for an expert’s proffered evidence.4
But this threshold gatekeeping requirement, though now wellensconced, continues to raise as many questions as it answers. How high
should the threshold be? Just how much scientific support must ground an
expert’s opinion to warrant admissibility? How should a court assess
whether experts know what they think they know? And, moreover, how
should courts go about determining whether the expert’s knowledge is based
on sufficiently good grounds to be admitted? These questions have
particular salience when experts wish to testify to scientifically plausible but
weakly supported claims. Furthermore, in many product liability and toxic
torts cases, admissibility decisions about the expert’s testimony may well be
case-dispositive: admit the expert evidence, and the case—often involving a
tragic set of facts—comes before the jury, but exclude that evidence, and
summary judgment is a foregone conclusion because no admissible evidence
supports causation. When causation is possible but scientifically unproven,
how should the courts respond? If courts take seriously Daubert’s holding
that courts should employ scientific sensibilities to evaluate expert opinion
evidence, exclusion and summary judgment are doctrinally required when
adequate scientific support does not establish causation. But when
tantalizing glimmers of evidence suggest that causation is possible, albeit far
from scientifically established, some courts respond by resisting, or
stretching, Daubert’s strictures. In this Article, we consider the curious case
of Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline, a Ninth Circuit decision that fails so
dramatically to employ scientific reasoning that it serves well as a cautionary
tale.
Wendell also illustrates how, when courts are making admissibility
decision under conditions of scientific uncertainty, their reasoning matters
as much as the conclusion. To put the point starkly: the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Wendell is indefensible, but its conclusion might not be – at
least if it had been making an admissibility judgment in the first instance,
rather than on appeal. On appeal, however, we see little justification for
overturning the trial court’s judgment, given the paucity of scientific
evidence to support causation and the appropriate standard of review – and
certainly, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning on this score is not persuasive.
When we began writing this Article, the Supreme Court had yet to
decide whether to review the Ninth Circuit’s holding. Ultimately, the Court
did not grant cert.5 Nonetheless, we expect that the Court will need to engage
3

Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90.
5
The case, renamed Teva Parmaceuticals, Inc. v. Wendell, has been scheduled for
conference for March 16, 2018. See SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.c
4
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further with questions about the application of Rule 702 and Daubert to the
many thorny issues of causation in toxic tort cases. In what follows, we
therefore use Wendell as a case study and an object lesson, but the important
issues raised by this case about how to –and how not to – assess causation in
toxic torts cases have implications well beyond this particular instance and
example.
II. CURIOUSER AND CURIOUSER
Like many such cases, the underlying story of Wendell is
heartbreakingly tragic. Maxx Wendell died at the age of twenty-one of
Hepatosplenic T-cell lymphoma (HSTCL), a very rare and aggressive
cancer. Prior to developing HSTCL, Maxx was treated with a variety of
drugs for inflammatory bowel disease (IBD), including in particular,
mercaptopurine (6-MP). Maxx’s parents sued the manufacturers of these
drugs, claiming that 6-MP interacted with another drug, the tumor necrosis
factor alpha antagonist (anti-TNF), to cause Maxx’s HSTCL.
Two highly qualified physicians “opined in their expert reports that the
combination of 6-MP drugs and anti-TNF drugs prescribed to Maxx
increased his likelihood of developing HSTCL and, ultimately, caused his
death.”6 But the district court found that these opinions “are not based on
sufficiently reliable scientific data,” and hence, could not be admissible
under Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. The district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs had
“failed to present sufficient evidence to support an inference that [6-MP],
either alone or in combination with anti-TNF drugs, caused Maxx to develop
HSTCL.”7 There was no dispute about whether the experts were qualified
or whether their opinions were relevant. But the district court appropriately
recognized that the key evidentiary question was neither of these, but rather,
whether the experts’ opinions themselves were adequately reliable.
The district court had little difficulty answering that question in the
negative. As the judge explained, plaintiffs’ experts conceded that there
were neither animal studies nor any epidemiological studies indicating the
relationship between 6-MP and anti-TNF drugs and the development of
HSTCL. Moreover, the experts acknowledged that they did not employ the
same level of rigor in forming their expert testimony that they would use for
reaching similar determinations directed at other scientists rather than the
court, through publication in peer-reviewed journals rather than testimony.
om/case-files/cases/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-wendell/.
6
Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 2943572, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
June 30, 2014), rev’d sub nom. Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
2017).
7
Id. at *7.
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For instance, when one expert “was asked whether his opinions in this case
would be publishable in a medical article, he replied that the standard for
publication would ‘probably be more rigorous’ than the standard he applied
in forming his opinions.”8 In addition, more than seventy percent of HSTCL
cases, according to the experts, are idiopathic, meaning that the cause is
unknown. This, the trial judge correctly realized, makes it impossible to
determine cause reliably simply by making use of a differential etiology
method, whereby other known causes are eliminated;9 if the main cause is
“unknown,” eliminating other known causes establishes little, absent “some
reliable evidence of a positive link between the drugs at issue and the
disease.”10 To be sure, some case reports and incident studies the experts
relied upon described other examples of HSTCL—acknowledged to be an
extremely rare cancer—among other patients who also had taken a
combination of 6-MP and anti-TNF drugs (though not necessarily the precise
same drugs as Maxx). But for the trial court, these reports amounted to
suggestive anecdotes, not scientific proof—nor, according to the court, had
the physicians eliminated IBD itself as a potential cause of Maxx’s cancer.
Up to this point, the story is familiar. The plaintiffs’ experts relied on
a generalized clinical judgment, informed largely by anecdote and
conjecture, perhaps plausible, but insufficiently proven. While the experts
were willing to testify to a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” about
cause, even they acknowledged their causal conjecture didn’t rise to the
standards of peer review in a scientific journal. Since the law requires that
the underlying basis for the experts’ opinion be adequately supported by
“scientific knowledge,” the trial court excluded their testimony. Once their
experts’ opinions were excluded, the plaintiffs lacked sufficient—or indeed
any—admissible evidence of causation, so the defendant’s summary
judgment motion was, naturally, granted. Additionally, given the holding in
General Electric Company v. Joiner,11 which mandates an abuse of
discretion standard for the appellate review of trial courts’ admissibility
decisions involving expert evidence, the appellate outcome appeared welldetermined. In light of Daubert and Rule 702’s insistence that scientific
opinions in court require an adequate scientific basis, how could a trial judge
who excludes expert opinions based solely on clinical judgment, case
reports, and conjecture (and without animal studies, epidemiological studies,
or a persuasive differential etiology) be seen to have abused his discretion?

8

Id. at *4.
See infra notes 22–23 for a more complete discussion of the methods associated with
“differential etiology.”
10
Wendell, 2014 WL 2943572, at *5.
11
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
9
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At the Ninth Circuit, however, is where the case gets “curiouser and
curiouser.”12 The appellate court at least nominally accepted that its review
was limited to the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.13 But the
court went on to warn that it reviews de novo the “construction or
interpretation of . . . the Federal Rules of Evidence, including whether
particular evidence falls within the scope of a given rule.”14
Unfortunately, the appellate court never returned to the question of
what standard of review it employed to overturn the trial court’s decision,
nor precisely what it meant by its statement that it had the power to review
de novo “whether particular evidence falls within the scope of a given rule.”
On its face, of course, the testimony of the plaintiffs’ two experts
unambiguously fell within the scope of Rule 702. Thus, the lower court’s
finding that the evidence here—i.e., expert medical causation evidence—
was subject to Rule 702 was plainly not error. While the appropriate scope
of Rule 702 could indeed be a legal question warranting de novo review, that
hardly seems applicable to these facts; there was no plausible argument that
Rule 702 did not apply to the causation evidence proffered by the plaintiffs’
experts. A more ambitious reading of the appellate court’s assertion—that
is, that all admissibility decisions regarding whether expert evidence is
admissible “within the scope of the rule” is subject to de novo review—
would effectively nullify the Joiner ruling, and the court did not seem to
mean to go that far with its oblique sentence gesturing to some possible, not
fully specified, role for a de novo standard.
In any event, while the Ninth Circuit’s conclusions largely used the
rhetorical register of “abuse of discretion,” both its reasoning and its
conclusions are hard to justify under that deferential standard. The court
concludes that while it is a “close question,” the district court “erred” and
“abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Shustov’s and Dr. Weisenburger’s
testimony. . . .”15 Even if formally engaged in an abuse of discretion
analysis, the court did not seem to show the kinds of deference to the district
court that the standard would typically invite.
Why did the Ninth Circuit reach the opposite conclusion from the trial
court? Without question, the plaintiffs’ experts were two highly qualified
and well-regarded physicians.16 This fact turned out to be the primary basis
for the appellate court’s belief that the lower court had erred. The court
12
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 16 (Lothrop Publishing Co., 1898) (1865).
13
Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2017).
14
Id. at 1231 (alteration in original) (quoting Messick v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 747
F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2014)).
15
Id. at 1233, 1237.
16
Id. at 1233.
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summarized its view of the proffered expert evidence as follows:
“[M]edicine partakes of art as well as science.” Where, as here,
two doctors who stand at or near the top of their field and have
extensive clinical experience with the rare disease or class of
disease at issue, are prepared to give expert opinions supporting
causation, we conclude that Daubert poses no bar based on their
principles and methodology.17
This remarkable paragraph deserves to be dissected and examined in at
least three parts. The first involves the court’s broad-brush assertion
regarding medicine partaking of art as well as science. The second is the
outsized role qualifications played in the court’s assessment. And the third
concerns the relationship, if any, between extensive clinical experience and
determining medical causation.
III. EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. Scientific Evidence That is Based on Art, Not Science
Whenever someone asserts that “[m]edicine partakes of art as well as
science,” we can suspect that science, at least in this instance, is likely being
tossed to the wind. It is not that the claim is wrong – the practice of medicine
is indeed both an art and a science; but a claim of scientific causation ought
to be grounded in valid scientific knowledge and based on reasoned
explanations that go beyond medicine as an ‘art.’ The court itself noted
earlier in its opinion that “[s]cientific evidence is reliable ‘if the principles
and methodology used by an expert are grounded in the methods of
science.’”18 The question presented in Wendell was straightforward, even if
the answer was anything but. Specifically, the key question was whether or
not the defendant’s drug was substantial cause of Maxx’s illness. While
medical treatment may indeed have artistry associated with it, where the art
lies in determining whether adequate scientific support establishes that A
causes B is far less obvious; and the Ninth Circuit, in any case, did not
explain it. Furthermore, Daubert and its progeny stand for the idea that
expert evidence requires more than “ipse dixit” to be admissible—hunches,
conjectures, and even a good nose for diagnosis are not enough to warrant
admissibility.

17
18

2003)).

Id. at 1237 (quoting Messick, 747 F.3d at 1198).
Id. at 1232 (quoting Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir.
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Of course, there are times when experience—what the Ninth Circuit
likely meant by “art”—should be a basis for, and possibly even a sufficient
basis for, admitting expert evidence. The difficulty lies in determining when
this is so. Courts regularly admit all sorts of experts based on their
experience with a subject area, from auto mechanics to real estate appraisers.
These disciplines neither hold themselves out to be scientific, nor do their
fields regularly employ scientific methods to test their hypotheses.
Nonetheless, common sense recognizes that some fields, and some experts,
have relevant and reliable knowledge to impart to judicial proceedings based
on their long experience with the subject. The classic example of this is the
harbor pilot who has maneuvered a particular waterway hundreds of times
and is called upon to provide an expert opinion, say, about the dangers of a
sandbar to local shipping. In such cases, experience will indeed provide
useful expertise that ordinarily will meet the strictures of Rule 702.19
At the same time, the courts have a long and troubled history of
permitting experienced-based expert testimony in cases that are ostensibly
based on scientific techniques, but which have not been validated beyond the
everyday experience of the so-called experts. Most notoriously, this has
occurred, and continues to occur, in courts’ reception of forensic science.20
Historically, many forensic specialties were admitted based on experience
but, when later tested by standard methods of science, turned out to be deeply
flawed, often overstated, and sometimes wholly invalid. Some areas no
longer admitted in court include microscopic hair identification analysis,
bullet-lead comparison, and certain claims made by arson investigators.
Other forensic areas of doubtful scientific value, but with experiential claims
of reliability, include bitemark identification evidence and some additional
areas of pattern-recognition expertise.21

19

For efforts to consider and taxonomize the functions of expertise and its use as
evidence, and to identify distinct admissibility challenges posed by different kinds of
evidence, see, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of
Expertise for the Post-Kumho World, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508 (2000); Samuel R. Gross
& Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy,
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141 (2003); David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher
Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 417 (2014)
20
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncj
rs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
21
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURECOMPARISON METHODS 8 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/file
s/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf.
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Ultimately, experience only has value as a basis for grounding expert
claims when there is a feedback loop that allows the expert to learn whether
his or her experience is accurate. Hence, the harbor pilot’s knowledge of
obstructions is likely borne from actual feedback regarding their existence
and danger, either from personal experience or the direct experience of his
or her colleagues. In comparison, a forensic science such as hair
identification analysis does not typically give the examiner any feedback on
the accuracy of the exam. Such experts might learn that the defendant whose
hair they examined was convicted or acquitted, but this provides at best
limited information about the value or accuracy of their identification
methods. Indeed, as we have seen with the long tenure that many claims
based on experience have had, from blood-letting in medicine to bitemark
identification in the law, self-described experts often remain convinced of
the value of their expertise even in the face of contrary research data.
To be sure, in the case of medicine, art might indeed play something of
a role in the treatment knowledge that doctors develop. After all, if a doctor
has treated a certain illness numerous times, he or she is likely to learn what
seems to work and what has not worked with similarly situated patients. For
the most part—though not invariably—doctors receive feedback about the
outcomes of their therapy. If the patient gets better, a doctor is likely to try
the same treatment with the next similarly situated patient. Over time,
continued success—or failure—with a treatment regimen will give the
physician considerable useful, albeit informal, data on its utility. Yet, even
on the treatment side of medicine, many doctors hold fast to treatments for a
very long time that, ultimately, are demonstrated to be ineffective through
careful research.22 Nonetheless, in regard to treatment outcomes, doctors are
more like harbor pilots than hair identification analysts.
However, in Wendell, the question presented was not a treatment issue,
nor a matter of diagnosis; it was a question of causation. On this question,
doctors are unlikely to receive such direct feedback on their conjectures
about what caused a particular illness. Feedback loops are frequently nonexistent, or at least weaker, when physicians are assessing questions of
medical causation.23 Indeed, case law is replete with examples of speculative
22
See, e.g., David Epstein, When Evidence Says No, But Doctors Say Yes, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/when-evidence-saysno-but-doctors-say-yes/517368/ (arguing that although stents for stable patients provide no
benefits, “hundreds of thousands of stable patients receive stents annually . . .”). See also
Vinay Prasad et al., A Decade of Reversal: An Analysis of 146 Contradicted Medical
Practices, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 790 (Aug. 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013
.05.012 (finding that 146 of 363 current medical practices are ineffective).
23
To be sure, in some instances, physicians may have solid ways to test their theories of
causation. If the physician’s theory of cause is something testable—an allergen, or an
exposure to something in the environment that can be controlled or tested, the physician may
indeed receive feedback about what happens to the patient when that allergen is avoided. But
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medical beliefs about causation that resulted in litigation only to turn out not
to be valid when adequately researched. Bendectin, the subject of Daubert
itself, and silicone implants, which generated hundreds of thousands of
lawsuits, are two particularly prominent examples.24 On issues of medical
causation, then, medical doctors are more like hair identification analysts.
They certainly might speculate about the causes of the illnesses that they
treat, but the best—and only scientifically valid—answers to those questions
will come from the research literature. And, ordinarily, this will involve
some combination of toxicological and epidemiological studies.
B. Relying on Qualifications Alone
The fact that the Ninth Circuit was impressed with the qualifications of
the two experts has marginal value to the review of the lower court’s
admissibility decision. The lower court also found plaintiffs’ experts to be
well-qualified clinicians. The issue was not whether they were impressive
doctors; rather, it was the adequacy of the basis for their opinions regarding
causation that the district court found wanting. In this respect, the Ninth
Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the role of qualifications in the
assessment of expert testimony. Rule 702, of course, requires that experts
be qualified in their respective areas of expertise before being allowed to
testify. But this is a necessary, not a sufficient, requirement. In fact, in the
rule itself, qualifications operate as a prologue to the rule’s substantial
additional requirements: “a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill experience, training or education may testify. . . if” (and,
implicitly, only if) the evidence is: (a) helpful to the trier of fact; (b) based
on sufficient facts and data; (c) the result of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) reliably applied in this instance.25 A surprising number of courts,
however, appear to share the Ninth Circuit’s overvaluing of this preliminary
requirement.26
for many diseases, the doctor will have no way to test a theory about cause at the level of the
individual patient.
24
JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL; A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998);
MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The
Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000); MARCIA ANGELL: SCIENCE
ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT Case
(1997).
25
FED. R. EVID. 702.
26
See, e.g., Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng’g, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171, 1185 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir.
2003)) (“Although an expert’s qualifications go primarily to the first prong of Daubert’s
inquiry, ‘an expert’s overwhelming qualifications may bear on the reliability of his proffered
testimony’ even if ‘they are by no means a guarantor of reliability.’”). See generally Graves
v. Mazda Motor Corp., 405 F. App’x 296 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he ipse dixit of an expert, no
matter how qualified he may be, is never enough to guarantee him a ticket to admissibility.”);
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Beyond the plain meaning of Rule 702, there are many reasons why
courts should not rest admissibility decisions on qualifications alone.
Foremost, perhaps, is the significant danger, especially acute in our
adversarial system, that even the most qualified professionals may be
tempted to propound opinions that go beyond what sound science can
support. The adversarial process already leads to the selection of party
experts that are likely to be at the tails of scientific opinion27 and case
demands likely further prod experts to more categorical or extreme
statements than they might otherwise maintain among their professional
colleagues. Indeed, with all due respect to the plaintiffs’ experts in Wendell,
this is exactly what may have happened in that case. At least one of the
experts explicitly conceded that his opinion “to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty” for courtroom purposes would not meet the standards
used for peer review and publication in science. Courts need to ensure that
otherwise qualified experts stay within their expertise when testifying,
particularly given the pressures of partisanship that may invite, consciously
or not, overstatements that assist the party paying for their testimony.28
Additionally, the entire notion of “qualifications” is a professionspecific classification.29 A world-renowned oncologist might be extremely
“well-qualified” as a treating physician but have scant expertise in
identifying the causes of cancer. A DNA technician might be well qualified
to perform the rote protocol of PCR testing, but lack expertise in
understanding molecular biology and thus what the empirical basis for the
test itself is. And a fingerprint expert might know how to apply the standard
approach to identification—known as ACE-V30—but have no understanding
of its validity or lack thereof. A witness “qualified” in his or her field might,

DAVID L. FAIGMAN, EDWARD K. CHENG, JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, ERIN E. MURPHY, JOSEPH
SANDERS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:12 (2017–2018 ed. 2017).
27
See Jonah B. Gelbach, Expert Mining and Required Disclosure, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
131, 131 (2014) (describing “expert mining” as the practice, by “resourceful attorneys” of
“hiring multiple experts, asking each to provide an expert report on the same issue, and then
put[ting] on the stand only the one who provides the most favorable report”).
28
For an effort to develop institutional tools to combat this set of structural dilemmas,
see JuriLytics, founded by David Faigman, one of this Article’s authors. For the history of
expert evidence showing how partisanship has been an extremely longstanding (and hard to
combat) concern, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An
Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763 (2007).
29
See RG Steel Sparrows Point, LLC v. Kinder Morgan Bulk Terminals, Inc., 609 F.
App’x 731, 738 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The question of whether a witness is qualified to testify is
context-driven and can only be determined by the nature of the opinion he offers.”).
30
ACE-V stands for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, Verification.
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or might not, be “qualified” to testify on the specific issue in dispute at trial.
In short, there is always a question of fit between an expert’s professional
qualifications and whether he or she is qualified to provide the testimony
offered in court.
C. What is the “Task at Hand” in Medical Causation Testimony?
A fundamental flaw in the Ninth Circuit’s review was its equating
expertise in treating a disease with expertise in identifying the cause of that
disease.31 These are substantially different skillsets and there is little basis
for believing that clinical skill equates to scientific acumen. To be sure,
some clinicians may also be accomplished research scientists, or at least
competent interpreters of a research literature, but the fact that the Venn
diagrams may well overlap does not mean that a qualified clinician should
necessarily be permitted to testify about causation. Indeed, when the Ninth
Circuit turned to the question of causation, it offered up both non sequiturs
and inadequately supported conclusions.
Ordinarily, as the district court recognized, medical causation contains
two separate levels of analysis, what is often referred to as general causation
and specific causation. The former involves whether scientific support exists
for the proposition that a particular drug or substance causes a particular
illness; and the latter involves whether there is support for the proposition
that a particular drug or substance caused the particular instance of that
illness at issue in the case. General causation is a prerequisite to specific
causation, since, if there is no proof that the drug or substance can cause the
illness, then there can be no proof that it did cause the illness in a particular
case.
Unfortunately, in Wendell, the Ninth Circuit did little more than restate
the conclusory assertions of the plaintiffs’ experts, making no serious effort
to evaluate their accuracy or basis. For example, Dr. Shustov, one of the
plaintiffs’ two experts, said he relied “on medical records as well as [his]
education, training and experience, knowledge of the pertinent medical
literature and [his] knowledge of the epidemiology, diagnosis and natural
history of HSTCL.”32 He said that he “pulled the facts out of the literature,”
which indicated “an increased risk of HSTCL in patients taking 6-MP over
the general population.”33 Presumably, all of this was offered as a basis for
a finding of general causation.
However, the Ninth Circuit did not provide any significant analysis of
this literature, which, as the experts themselves conceded, lacked any

31
32
33

See Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1233–34 (2017).
Id. at 1234.
Id.
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toxicological or epidemiological studies. From what the Ninth Circuit
discusses in the four corners of its opinion, it is challenging to understand
what to make of the claim of an “increased risk” in this context, since they
described no effort to control for confounding variables. Such statements
are reminiscent of the spurious causal connection between the amount of ice
cream consumed at a beach and the number of drownings; they are, of
course, associated, but ice cream consumption in no way causes drownings:
they are linked by a third variable, the number of beachgoers, and perhaps
also by a fourth, the warmth of the day, which likely affects both how many
beachgoers take to the water and how many go for the ice cream. This
example, and Dr. Shustov’s opinion, both risk the elementary error of
assuming that correlation demonstrates causation. The Ninth Circuit offered
no analysis to establish that Dr. Shustov’s opinion was anything more than
superficially plausible conjecture and speculation, grounded in anecdote, and
dressed up in the garb of scientific jargon. Dr. Shustov claimed that, “[a]fter
reviewing the literature, he ‘compiled the numbers about frequency of
diseases, about frequency of inflammatory bowel disease and [he] looked at
the biological causation of lymphoma pertaining to this case.’”34 But what
does this last sentence even mean without further explication? The Ninth
Circuit made no attempt to explain it.
After apparently reaching a conclusion about the general causation
between 6-MP and HSTCL, Dr. Shustov went on to offer an opinion on
specific causation. In medical causation cases, this is typically achieved
through a method best described as “differential etiology.” This form of
analysis requires first ruling in the putative cause (here 6-MP) as possible
and then ruling out other possible causes as inapplicable to the facts. This
notion of differential etiology is sometimes confused with a similar worded
method called “differential diagnosis.” Differential diagnosis is a method
for identifying what illness a person suffers from; differential etiology, in
contrast, is a method for determining what caused that illness. The two
sound similar, but require very different knowledge bases and skillsets.
According to Dr. Shustov, however, the two are essentially the same.
He said that “he performs differential diagnosis in attempting to diagnose
every patient, and that he has applied the same technique to determine the
cause of a disease.”35 According to the court, his differential [etiology]
“assumes the pertinence of all potential causes, then rules out the ones as to
which there is no plausible evidence of causation, and then determines the
most likely cause among those that cannot be excluded.”36 The Ninth Circuit

34
35
36

Id.
Id.
Id.
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found this to be “scientifically sound.”37 But given that there was insufficient
proof of general causation, and that over 70% of HSTCL cases are
idiopathic—that is to say, without known cause—the soundness of this
differential analysis is far from obvious. The court summarized Dr.
Shustov’s reasoning regarding his conclusion on the cause of Maxx’s illness
as follows:
Dr. Shustov stated that there was a one in six million chance that
Maxx would have developed HSTCL without being exposed to 6MP. In light of those odds, Dr. Shustov stated that “based on [his]
experience in T-cell lymphomas, knowledge of the literature and
being involved in T-cell lymphoma research in the past ten years”
he determined “that it’s much more likely that exposure to
mutagen and immunosuppressants caused the lymphoma.”38
The scientific logic of this analysis is, at a minimum, inadequately
specified, and may well be far from sound. Ultimately, the court returned to
the qualifications of the two experts, once again conflating their medical
credentials with the soundness of their testimony. The court asserted,
“[n]othing in Daubert, or its progeny, properly understood, suggests that the
most experienced and credentialed doctors in a given field should be barred
from testifying based on a differential diagnosis.”39 But, in fact, everything
in Daubert and its progeny suggests that “the most experienced and
credentialed doctors in a given field should be barred from testifying” if their
differential diagnosis is not sufficiently scientifically valid.40
In addition to its emphasis on credentials as justifying the legitimacy of
the experts’ conclusions, the appellate court seemed to think, more generally,
that the district court’s approach to evaluating the experts was too formalistic
and cramped. The Ninth Circuit wrote,
The district court looked too narrowly at each individual
consideration, without taking into account the broader picture of
the experts’ overall methodology. It improperly ignored the
experts’ experience, reliance on a variety of literature and studies,
and review of Maxx’s medical records and history, as well as the
fundamental importance of differential diagnosis by experienced
doctors treating troubled patients. The district court also
overemphasized the facts that (1) the experts did not develop their
opinions based on independent research and (2) the experts did not
37
38
39
40

See Wendell, 858 F.3d at 1234.
Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id.
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cite epidemiological studies. We hold that all together, these
mistakes warrant reversal.41
The appellate court is asserting, in essence, that the district court’s
analysis was excessively atomistic, “look[ing] too narrowly at each
individual consideration” rather than “the broader picture. . . .”42 On this
point, the Ninth Circuit’s admonition is correct in theory but deeply
problematic in application.
It is true that some courts have been excessively atomistic in their
analysis of expert claims. Excessive atomism risks making two errors, one
evidentiary and the other scientific.43 As a matter of evidence law, “a brick
is not a wall”—that is, proof of a necessary element can be made up of many
distinct bricks, and no individual item of evidence must prove the point
alone. From an evidentiary perspective, there is nothing inappropriate about
establishing causation by aggregating multiple items of evidence, no one of
which establishes causation alone. And scientists, too, can and do aggregate
multiple discrete and disparate items of evidence to reach a conclusion. Some
scientific aggregation methods may be formal and methodologically
rigorous, like structured meta-analyses, while others may be more informal
or the product of collective engagements by experts, like the Cochrane
reviews, or government consensus panels, or assessing general causation by
using the Bradford Hill guidelines.44 When aggregation is legitimate, and
when it may become an excuse for insufficiently justified expert conclusions
based on “soi-disant” expertise and hand-waving is not simple to answer. It
depends, both, on the details of the underlying evidentiary support for a given
claim, as well as the specific question being asked. This focus on whether
the scientific basis supports the particular, concrete testimony offered in
court was referred to as the “task at hand” in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, the
third case in the Daubert trilogy, and is an important concept defined and
41

Id. at 1233.
Id.
43
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence, 60
UCLA L. REV. 1524, 1576–80 (2013).
44
See generally Lawrence Cetrulo, Evaluating the Totality of the Evidence: The
Bradford Hill Criteria, in 3 TOXIC TORTS LITIG. GUIDE § 22:5 (2017); Kirsten Bell, Cochrane
Reviews and the Behavioural Turn in Evidence-Based Medicine, 21 HEALTH SOC. REV. 313
(2012); David C. Currow & Irene J. Higginson, Cochrane Reviews: Four Proposals for
Improvement, 18 J. PALLIATIVE MED. (2015) 906–07; Matthew J. Gabel & Charles R. Shipan,
A Social Choice Approach to Expert Consensus Panels, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 543–64 (2004);
Dr. Frank C. Woodside and Allison G. Davis, The Bradford Hill Criteria: The Forgotten
Predicate, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 103 (2013); P.M. Wortman, Consensus Panels:
Methodology, INT’L ENCY. SOC. BEHAV. SCI. 2609–13 (2001); COCHRANE HANDBOOK FOR
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS OF INTERVENTIONS (Julian P.T. Higgins & Sally Green eds. 2011),
http://handbook-5-1.cochrane.org/.
42
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refined brilliantly by Professor Michael Risinger in his scholarship.45
At one extreme, there is a danger of courts applying Daubert too
rigidly, piece by piece, and looking too narrowly at each item of evidence—
perhaps even insisting upon a single “smoking gun” piece of causation
evidence, like a precisely on point epidemiological study showing a
substantially heightened relative risk, as a necessary precondition to proving
cause. An excessively atomistic judicial analysis pulls apart each item of
evidence, dismissing each strand, study, or claim as inadequately
establishing what needs to be proven, providing inadequate opportunity to
assess whether the evidence, taken in its entirety, makes the case that the
“weight of the evidence” establishes causation by a preponderance.46
But in this case, the Ninth Circuit teeters distressingly far in the other
direction. The opinion’s analysis emphasizes—about a number of issues and
concerns—that each is not necessary for evidence to be admissible under
Daubert and Rule 702.47 On each of these points taken individually, the
Ninth Circuit is correct. But in aggregate, it errs, particularly given the
alleged application of Joiner’s abuse of discretion standard, by failing to
recognize that while any given limitation might not be fatal, to have so many
strongly suggests that there are not adequate scientific grounds that support
the opinion, or at a minimum, that the district court’s determination was
squarely within the bounds of reasoned discretion.
For example, as the court correctly notes, it ought not necessarily to be
fatal that an expert’s opinion does not derive from independent research.48
While opinions derived specifically for court escalate the danger of
partisanship, often questions come to the fore as a result of litigation and so
the fact that experts developed their opinions in that posture ought not, by
itself, preclude admissibility.49 Similarly, epidemiological studies, while
enormously helpful, ought not to be a sine qua non, particularly because for
45
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); D. Michael Risinger,
Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000).
46
The legitimacy of “weight of the evidence” approaches to assessing toxic torts cases
has been debated by both courts and commentators. See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty
Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011); Mnookin, supra note 42; Michael D. Green,
Pessimism about Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 41 (2013); Sheldon Krimsky, The
Weight of Scientific Evidence in Policy and Law, 95 AM J. PUB. HEALTH S129 (2005),
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/10.2105/AJPH.2004.044727.
47
Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 858 F.3d 1227, 1234-36 (9th Cir. 2017).
48
Id. at 1235.
49
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316–19 (9th Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing on remand the significance of this criterion in assessing expert testimony);
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK.
L. REV. 1009, 1014, 1023 (2008). See also David Sonenshein & Charles Fitzpatrick, The
Problem of Partisan Experts and the Potential for Reform through Concurrent Evidence, 32
REV. LITIG. 1 (2013).
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truly rare, low incident diseases, they may be wholly implausible, and, more
generally, because it may be possible to aggregate non-epidemiological
evidence in a way that supports a finding of both general and specific
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. A lack of animal studies and
toxicological assessments also ought not necessarily be fatal either, if other
strong evidence (like, perhaps, well-designed epidemiological studies)
supports causation. The same goes for a lack of a well-specified biological
mechanism for causation—again, if other persuasive evidence, like strong
epidemiological support, exists, then an absence of a detailed or proven
causal mechanism may be acceptable. But when all of these are absent—no
animal studies, no epidemiological evidence, no causal mechanism beyond
the fact that one of the drugs is known to be carcinogenic—and when the
cancer itself is largely idiopathic, then credentials, conjectures and case
reports cannot simply be alchemically combined to produce valid scientific
conclusions.
It may be that a particular set of facts and circumstances could, in rare
instances, warrant a finding of causation even without any of these traditional
hallmarks of scientific causation—but in that case, one would want to see
very carefully reasoned, thoughtful engagement of how and why causation
could nonetheless be inferred in this “task at hand,” from whatever evidence
in fact supported it. In Wendell, however, the Ninth Circuit did not offer
such an analysis.
Given the absence of toxicology, epidemiology, or a clear biological
mechanism, why did the Ninth Circuit strain so hard to overturn the summary
judgment ruling of the district court, notwithstanding the deferential abuse
of discretion standard? Why did they engage in such a dramatically nonstringent approach to Daubert and Rule 702, overturning the trial court’s
ruling and deeming admissible expert testimony with distressingly little
significant scientific support?
Although they did not offer a detailed assessment of what persuaded
them, part of the answer likely lies in the superficial plausibility of the case
reports in this particular area, even standing alone. HSTCL is extremely rare,
with only a total of a few hundred reported cases worldwide since the disease
variant was identified two decades ago. And a number of these cases have
in fact been reported in young men with conditions quite like Maxx’s—
indeed a 2013 aggregation of case reports found thirty-seven cases of
HSTCL in patients with medical conditions similar to Maxx’s, and in threequarters of those cases, the patients had taken a pair of medicines similar to
Maxx’s.50 Most of these cases occurred in younger men – again, like Maxx.
50
Saranya A. Selvaraj et al., Use of Case Reports and the Adverse Event Reporting
System in Systematic Reviews: Overcoming Barriers to Assess the Link Between Crohn’s
Disease Medications and Hepatosplenic T-Cell Lymphoma, 2:53 SYSTEMATIC REV. 1 (2013),
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Indeed, because of the reporting of HSTCL in the adverse event reporting
system for approved drugs, these medicines now contain warnings that alert
physicians and patients to the possibility of an elevated risk of HSTCL.
Given the rarity of the disease, the number of HSTCL cases diagnosed in
patients on these kinds of drugs certainly looks like it might be more than a
coincidence. But as the 2013 publication asserts, the authors cannot establish
“a causative effect other than ‘possible’” because of “the limited
applicability of causality assessment tools for rare irreversible events.”51
“Possible,” standing alone, is not enough to establish legal causation by a
preponderance of the evidence.
Although the 2013 aggregation cited above was not referenced by the
experts, one of the experts in the case had, in fact, relied on an earlier
published aggregation of case reports that also illustrated a substantial
“cluster” of thirty-six cases of HSTCL in patients similar to Maxx.52 Of the
approximately 200 cases of HSTCL reported worldwide since this variant of
lymphoma was identified in the mid-90s, thirty-six of them are associated
with IBD patients receiving thiopurines, and twenty of those were also
receiving some anti-TNF therapy as well. The vast majority of those IBD
patients diagnosed with HSTCL were, like Maxx, young and male.
This is striking data. For an extraordinarily rare disease of unknown
cause, the fact that approximately twenty percent of the known instances are
associated with both a relatively common illness and a particular family of
drug treatments is certainly suggestive. The authors of the 2011 article offer
some slightly back-of-the envelope relative risks based on the data they have
available, which suggest a substantially higher risk of HSTCL among men
younger than thirty-five years old exposed either to thiopurines, or to both
thiopurines and anti-TNF medications, than among IBD patients generally.53
To infer causation from case reports is, to say the least, fraught, but the
apparent extreme rarity of the disease overall combined with a significant
minority of those cases being linked to treatments similar to Maxx’s was
what led the plaintiffs’ experts to assert their belief in causation “to a
reasonable degree of medical probability.” As Dr. Andrei Shustov wrote in
his report in the case:
https://systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/2046-4053-253?site=systematicreviewsjournal.biomedcentral.com.
51
Id.
52
Expert Report & Affidavit of Andrei Shustov, Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 09cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014) (citing David S. Kotlyar et al., A
Systematic Review of Factors That Contribute to Hepatosplenic T-Cell Lymphoma in Patients
with Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 9 CLINICAL GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 36
(2011), http://www.cghjournal.org/article/S1542-3565(10)00907-9/pdf). (Note that many of
these cases are the same cases of HSTCL as those in the other study.)
53
Id.
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Given the absolute rarity of this disease generally, a cluster of 36
cases arising in young, predominantly male patients treated for
IBD with thiopurines and TNF antagonists stands as almost a
signature of the disease. While the precise mechanism by which
these drugs used in the setting of IBD in young patients give rise
to HSTCL is not known, it is clear that the use of these drugs,
either individually (in the case of the thiopurines) or in
combination, either causes or contributes to the development of
HSTCL in certain patients. This high incidence of an exceedingly
rare cancer in this distinct cohort is compelling evidence of
causation.
Maxx Wendell was one of those patients. He was a young male
with ulcerative colitis (a form of inflammatory bowel disease)
with a history of 5+ years of treatment with a thiopurine in
combination with the TNF antagonists Remicade and Humira who
developed an exceedingly rare cancer almost uniquely associated
with this treatment regimen in this cohort. To a reasonable degree
of medical probability, the combination use of a thiopurine with
TNF antagonists for the treatment of his inflammatory bowel
disease caused, or substantially contributed, to the development of
HSTCL to which he succumbed four months after diagnosis
despite multiple aggressive therapies.
I hold all of these opinions to a reasonable degree of medical
probability.54
Interestingly, also in 2013, Dr. Shustov wrote a blog post about
HSTCL, for the TCLLF, the T-Cell Leukemia Lymphoma Foundation.
There he couched his views in far less certain terms: “No specific cause of
HSTCL has been identified so far. However, in some cases, long
immunosuppression has been implicated. There is a suggestion that young
people who were treated for childhood inflammatory bowel disease (such as
ulcerative colitis and Crohn’s disease) might be at risk for developing
HSTCL.”55
The space between referencing “a suggestion” that treatments like
Maxx’s “might” be implicated in causing HSTCL and asserting “compelling
evidence of causation” to a “reasonable degree of medical probability” is
54
Expert Report & Affidavit of Andrei Shustov, Wendell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 09cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519380 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2014).
55
Andrei Shustov, Hepatosplenic T-Cell Lymphoma (HSTCL), T-CELL LEUKEMIA
LYMPHOMA FOUND. (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.tcllfoundation.org/blog/learning-corner/le
arning-corner/hepatosplenic-t-cell-lymphoma-hstcl.
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fairly substantial. Obviously, these were written for different audiences, and
perhaps it is unfair to compare the language used in these two settings to one
another. But it is, in any event, worth detailing why the “cluster” evidence,
while dramatic, may not be as persuasive as it seems to Dr. Shustov (and
perhaps to the Ninth Circuit). First, IBD itself is extremely common—in the
United States and Europe, the authors of the 2011 review estimate that 3.6
million people have IBD. Many of those—in one study, roughly forty-four
percent—have been exposed to thiopurines, and only a tiny handful have
gotten this rare form of cancer. That of course does not diminish the
suggestion that risk may be elevated with exposure, but it does make the
existence of confounds or other causes a matter of serious question.
Moreover, the fact that among IBD-linked cases, HSTCL seems to develop
predominantly in young men raises questions. Might there be something
about these men’s IBD itself, or some other genetic propensity, that caused
their HSTCL? It is important to recognize that these case reports could not
exclude that possibility. Furthermore, information from the adverse
reporting systems for drugs is understood to be far from perfect, so the
underlying data upon which these analysts were relying may have significant
weaknesses. In addition, notwithstanding Shustov’s assertion to the
contrary—and as pointed out explicitly by the defense experts—the
association of HSTCL with young men with IBD and a certain treatment
regimen did not amount to a “signature.” (Occasionally some diseases are
so exclusively associated with a given exposure that they amount to a
signature, like the association of asbestosis with exposure to asbestos.) But
recall that most known HSTCL cases are in fact idiopathic; that fact alone
establishes that HSTCL is therefore not a signature disease for IBD plus a
specific drug regimen. Moreover, some HSTCL cases have occurred in nonIBD patients after organ transplants (some of whom also had taken other
immunosuppressants, though different ones); as well as in some patients with
different diseases, some with no other diseases, and sometimes in women
and in older patients.
Finally, and critically, and as the defense experts emphasized in their
affidavits, case reviews simply are not valid science.56 As one of the defense
experts wrote, “While case reports may be suggestive of possible problems
that are worthy of further study, they in and of themselves do not constitute
proof of cause and effect relationships due to their anecdotal, potentially
confounded, non-standardized, and totally uncontrolled nature.”57 The other
defense expert concurs, claiming that “no reliable scientific evidence”
56

See, e.g., Expert Report & Affidavit of Robert J. Valuck, Wendell v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 09-cv-04124, 2013 WL 11025314 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013); Expert Report &
Affidavit of Andrew Place, No. 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519379 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014).
57
Id.
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supports causation.58
Without doubt, much about HSTCL and its causes is unknown. What
we have then, is a battle of the experts in a condition of genuine scientific
uncertainty. For the plaintiffs’ experts, the cluster of known cases and the
association of similar drug regimens with HSTCL in patients with
demographic similarities to Maxx is so striking, given the extreme disease
rarity, that they are willing to name his treatment regimen as the cause of his
cancer, even in the absence of the kinds of evidence one would typically wish
for to make such a judgment. By contrast, the defense experts emphasize
that the risk assessments within these aggregated case reports amount to
guesswork and conjecture, not science—at best, a hypothesis rather than
proof. From their perspective, we currently have, in fact, a complete lack of
epidemiological investigation, assessments using thoughtful case controls,
or any other genuine scientific basis for reaching a conclusion about
causation or making an accurate “relative risk” judgment about this
medication and this disease.
If we tamp down the slightly overwrought language on both sides, it
may be that both perspectives are at least partly right. What we have is a
plausible hypothesis of a causal link that has some meaningful, albeit
imperfect and limited, evidentiary support. But we also have, as the defense
recognized, a significant lack of the forms of scientific evidence that we
would typically deem necessary to assert causation.
There are, to be sure, potential public policy justifications for
permitting cases like Maxx’s to go to a factfinder even without what we
would generally wish for in terms of an adequate scientific foundation. For
rare, infrequent diseases like HSTCL, we may never have enough solid
scientific evidence to establish cause—and this may generate a structural risk
of under-deterrence if we insist upon solid science as a prerequisite to getting
to trial. Sometimes, the drugs at issue really will have caused the harm, while
under our current rules, plaintiffs may never be able to adequately prove this
causation with epidemiology or a strong understanding of the underlying
mechanism, especially when the disease itself is extremely rare. (Of course,
the opposite danger of over-deterrence may be at least as significant. If we
revise our tort law,59 or shift burdens of proof,60 or lower our expert evidence
standards so that manufacturers face trial notwithstanding shaky and limited
evidence supporting causation, valuable products may become costlier or
58
Expert Report & Affidavit of Andrew Place, No. 09-cv-04124, 2014 WL 10519379
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2014).
59
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997).
60
See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998); Kenneth S.
Abraham, Self-Proving Causation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1811 (2013).
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altogether kept from the market and from consumers who could benefit from
them.)
Legal decision-making under conditions of genuine scientific
uncertainty thus raises challenging issues, and Wendell is a prime example.
But we would suggest that we should face these public policy issues—and
these questions of tort law—squarely, rather than straining our rules of
evidence and treating expert conjecture as if it were science.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have sought to use the curious case of Wendell to
illustrate some of the fundamental challenges associated with assessing
causation in toxic tort cases. Why, precisely, have we called Wendell a
curious case? First, because we find the Ninth Circuit opinion very hard to
reconcile with their supposedly deferential standard of review. The district
court was almost certainly well within its discretion to exclude the proffered
expert testimony and the circuit court applied, it would seem, some level of
heightened scrutiny to reverse that decision. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
offered no substantive explanation for its disagreement with the lower court,
outside of its excessive–and curious–deference to the experts’ clinical
credentials. We think this credential-centric approach to the assessment of
expert evidence is not merely curious, but mistaken as both a matter of
science and as a matter of law.
It is critical to recognize, however, that Wendell is not curious in the
sense that the challenges it poses are unique or unusual: assessing whether
legally sufficient evidence supports causation is required in every toxic torts
case. Today, nearly 25 years after Daubert, courts still struggle with the task;
hence, we believe, this exploration of Wendell offers valuable lessons that
go well beyond the case. Wendell is also not curious in representing–albeit
in extreme form–the difficulty of drawing categorical distinctions between
admissibility and exclusion in causation contexts in which little research is
available. Especially when the scientific record is thin, the fine line between
legitimate inference from incomplete evidence, and inappropriate
speculation and conjecture, becomes both absolutely critical and particularly
challenging to navigate. Because many of the dynamics present in Wendell
are not uncommon, it is worth concluding with a few brief points about the
case and how, in our view, it should have been resolved.
(1) First, we strongly believe that if “abuse of discretion” is indeed
the appropriate standard of review, as G.E. v. Joiner clearly
stated, then the trial court’s determination ought not to have
been overturned. We recognize that the cluster of case reports
is suggestive of the possibility of a causal link, but it was
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entirely reasonable for the trial judge to decide that suggestive
though they were, they were not sufficient to support the
plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions about causation, given the neartotal absence of more traditional scientific evidence and
studies. (There are, in our view, some solid arguments in favor
of de novo review for expert claims that go beyond the
individual case, like general causation, but this debate goes
beyond the scope of our discussion here. But under G.E. v.
Joiner, we believe that the Ninth Circuit itself erred when it
asserted that the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiffs’
experts constituted legal error, given both the record and the
district court’s analysis of it.)
(2) Second, even if we imagine that the Ninth Circuit had been
determining admissibility under a de novo standard, we are
disappointed by the reasoning of the court and its strong
reliance on the experts’ credentials. It is critical for judges
assessing expert evidence under Daubert to go beyond the
expert’s bona fides and assess the expert’s claims and whether
they have adequate scientific or epistemic support. Credentials
need to be a starting point for an analysis of the admissibility
of expert evidence, not the heart of it, and certainly not a
justification for a qualified expert to offer opinions
insufficiently based on reliable methods and knowledge.
(3) That said, if we imagine that they had been analyzing the case
under a de novo standard, we believe that the Ninth Circuit
could have legitimately ruled in favor of the admissibility of
the plaintiffs’ evidence. To do so should have necessitated a
careful, critical look at the disease cluster evidence, and a
thoughtful engagement of why, given the extraordinary rarity
of the disease and the substantial fraction of cases apparently
associated with drug regimens much like Maxx’s, an inference
of causation, while far from certain, arguably could meet the
preponderance standard. Such an argument might also usefully
engage in careful thinking about what the legal system should
do when the evidence we would like to have may well never
exist. Should we think about expert evidence differently when
the epidemiological study we might wish for simply happens
not to have been done, compared to those instances when the
rarity of the disease at issue makes it that much harder to study?
Should we build some kind of “necessity” or “best realistic
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evidence” standard into the evidence rules, and if so, how ought
it to be operationalized?61
(4) Our analysis suggests that in assessing courts’ actions under
Daubert, it is both the conclusion and the reasoning that
matters. If the trial court had deemed the plaintiffs’ experts’
testimony admissible on the grounds that the experts were
adequately credentialed, that would, in our view, be an abuse
of discretion. If, however, the trial court deemed the plaintiffs’
experts’ testimony admissible on the basis of a thoughtful
assessment that explained why the inference of causation,
while not overwhelming, was adequate given the task at hand
and the facts available, the same conclusion would not be an
abuse of discretion. We do not think that appellate courts need
any form of “mixed” standard of review to make and apply this
distinction appropriately; the simple point is that in assessing
whether the district court exercised its discretion in a
reasonable way, the reasons given and the quality of the
analysis matter.
(5) Finally, this analysis suggests that at the district court level,
properly assessed, either admissibility or exclusion could have
been legitimate. Perhaps this is surprising, or even troubling,
given that we are talking about a scientific question of
causation. But it is, in fact, simply the consequence of (a) a
heightened admissibility standard like Daubert, combined with
(b) a flexible, multi-pronged standard-rather-than-rule
approach to reliability, and (c) an abuse of discretion standard.
Perhaps Wendell can best be seen as a case that helps to establish that
old adage that hard cases make bad law. The appellate judges may have had
the inchoate sense that the substantial cluster of similar cases, coupled with
the rarity of the disease, made the physicians’ claims of causation credible.
But the opinion took two important wrong turns: first, while nominally
applying an abuse of discretion standard, it in fact gave little discretion to the
trial judge’s quite reasonable conclusions. Second, the opinion placed far
too much emphasis on the credentials of the experts, rather than carefully
assessing the substantive basis for the causation claim. To be sure, assessing
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the merits of the relevant scientific claims is a substantially harder task than
assessing the experts’ credentials. In dissent in Daubert, Justice Rehnquist
worried about whether the courts were up to the task that Daubert set for
them: “I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping
responsibility in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert
testimony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation or the
authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.” We do
not believe that to fulfil their duties under Daubert, judges assessing
causation must become full-fledged amateur scientists. But we do believe
that they absolutely must delve into the substance of the scientific evidence.
They need to avoid arguments based on shortcuts like a near-exclusive focus
oncredentials and must instead ground their conclusions upon careful, casespecific assessment of the adequacy of the scientific and empirical evidence.
We grant, as Justice Rehnquist intimated, that this is no easy task, but we
have every confidence that the judiciary has not only the obligation but the
ability to do so.

